Legal Question in Civil Rights Law in Oregon

I would say that there is a very good case to be made that the search was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional under the 4th Amendment. If the search was unconstitutional, then the evidence found by the search cannot be used against you.

In a case which the United States Supreme Court declined to review, the 11th Circuit Court of appeals in 2008 upheld the right of an NFL franchise to search patrons entering the stadium (Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 530 F.3d 1320 (11the Cir. (Fla.) 2008). In doing so, it reviewed cases involving searches as a condition to entry to public places, such as stadiums. Here are the most relevant passages:

We have recently considered the constitutionality of suspicionless, warrantless searches of individuals assembling on public lands to engage in protests protected by the First Amendment. Bourgeois, 387 F.3d 1303. In Bourgeois, the appellants sought to engage in an annual protest of training conducted at the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia. The demonstrations occurred on public property immediately outside of Fort Benning. The City of Columbus, Georgia instituted a policy requiring suspicionless magnetometer searches of all persons seeking to attend the demonstrations. The City justified the searches in light of past conduct at the demonstrations, including �frenzied dancing,� large debris used to erect a �global village,� ignition of a smoke bomb, and trespassing on the grounds of Fort Benning, in violation of 18 U.S.C. � 1382. The City also noted that unrelated protesters at other venues had allegedly instigated instances of violence, and that the Homeland Security threat assessment was elevated. Id. at 1307, 1312. We held this suspicionless search unconstitutional in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, in part because the City had not shown its policy fell within one of the several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's requirements.

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In other cases where we have used the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invalidate consent, we found that it was the government imposing the condition and performing the search. E.g., Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324 (magnetometer searches instituted by city policy). Several courts have analyzed the �unconstitutional conditions� doctrine with respect to entry to large public gatherings such as rock concerts. In each of these cases, a government search upon entry was unconstitutional because it required the patron to choose between assertion of his constitutional rights and losing paid admission to the concerts. In each of these cases the entity imposing the condition was the government itself. E.g., Nakamoto v. Fasi, 64 Haw. 17, 635 P.2d 946, 949 (1981) (inspection policy imposed by the City of Honolulu); Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F.Supp. 10, 12 (M.D.Ala.1978) (search policy instituted by the Mayor of the City of Montgomery); Stroeber v. Comm'n Veteran's Auditorium, 453 F.Supp. 926, 929 (S.D.Iowa 1977) (search policy instituted by officials and the chief of police of the City of Des Moines); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F.Supp. 1134, 1139 (M.D.N.C.1977) (search policy instituted by officials of the City of Greensboro). Cases considered by Florida courts reveal the same circumstance of the government imposing an unconstitutional condition. E.g., Iaccarino, 767 So.2d at 473 (search policy for entry to music festival on private property mandated by city officials as a condition for the promoter's permit to hold the festival).

Although you were not losing paid admission to the park, you were losing your right to be in the park, which is obviously public property, so the lack of payment is not material.